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Abstract
A large number of web applications is based on a relational database together with a program,
typically a script, that enables the user to interact with the database through embedded SQL
queries and commands. In this paper, we introduce a method for formal automated verification
of such systems which connects database theory to mainstream program analysis. We identify a
fragment of SQL which captures the behavior of the queries in our case studies, is algorithmically
decidable, and facilitates the construction of weakest preconditions. Thus, we can integrate
the analysis of SQL queries into a program analysis tool chain. To this end, we implement
a new decision procedure for the SQL fragment that we introduce. We demonstrate practical
applicability of our results with three case studies, a web administrator, a simple firewall, and a
conference management system.
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1 Introduction
Web applications are often written in a scripting language such as PHP and store their
data in a relational database which they access using SQL queries and data-manipulating
commands [37]. This combination facilitates fast development of web applications, which
exploit the reliability and efficiency of the underlying database engine and use the flexibility
of the script language to interact with the user. While the database engine is typically a
mature software product with few if any severe errors, the script with the embedded SQL
statements does not meet the same standards of quality.
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With a few exceptions (such as [15, 19]) the systematic analysis of programs with
embedded-SQL statements has been a blind spot in both the database and the computer-
aided verification community. The verification community has mostly studied the analysis
of programs which fall into two classes: programs with (i) numeric variables and complex
control structure, (ii) complex pointer structures and objects; however, the modeling of
data and their relationships has not received the same attention. Research in the database
community on the other hand has traditionally focused on correct design of databases rather
than correct use of databases.
Our long-term research vision is to transfer and extend the techniques from the verification
and program analysis community to the realm of programs with embedded SQL. Since the
seminal papers of Hoare, the first step for developing a program analysis is a precise
mathematical framework for defining programming semantics and correctness. In this paper
we develop a Hoare logic for a practically useful but simple fragment of SQL, called SmpSQL,
and a simple scripting language, called SmpSL, which has access to SmpSQL statements.
Specifically, we describe a decidable logic for formulating specifications and develop a weakest
precondition calculus for SmpSL programs; thus our Hoare logic allows to automatically
discharge verification conditions. When analyzing SmpSL programs, we treat SQL as a black
box library whose semantics is given by database theory. Thus we achieve verification results
relative to the correctness of the underlying database engine.
We recall from Codd’s theorem [13] that the core of SQL is equivalent in expressive power
to first-order logic FO. Thus, it follows from Trakhtenbrot’s theorem [35] that it is undecidable
whether an SQL query guarantees a given post condition. We have therefore chosen our
SQL fragment SmpSQL such that it captures an interesting class of SQL commands, but
corresponds to a decidable fragment of first-order logic, namely FO2BD, the restriction of
first-order logic in which all variables aside from two range over fixed finite domains called
bounded domains. The decidability of the finite satisfiability problem of FO2BD follows from
that of FO2, the fragment of first-order logic which uses only two variables. Although
the decidability of FO2 was shown by Mortimer [30] and a complexity-wise tight decision
procedure was later described by Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [21], we provide the first efficient
implementation of finite satisfiability of FO2.
We illustrate our methodology on the example of a simple web administration tool based
on [22]. The PANDA web administrator is a simple public domain web administration
tool written in PHP. We describe in Section 2 how the core mailing-list administration
functionality falls into the scope of SmpSL. We formulate a specification consisting of a
database invariant and pre- and postconditions. Our framework allows us to automatically
check the correctness of such specifications using our own FO2BD reasoning tool.
Main contributions
1. We define SmpSQL, an SQL fragment which is contained in FO2BD.
2. We define a simple imperative script language SmpSL with embedded SmpSQL statements.
3. We give a construction for weakest preconditions in FO2BD for SmpSL.
4. We implemented the weakest precondition computation for SmpSL.
5. We implemented a decision procedure for FO2BD. The procedure is based on the decidability
and NEXPTIME completeness result for FO2 by [21], but we use a more involved algorithm
which reduces the problem to a SAT solver and is optimized for performance.
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We evaluate our methodology on three applications: a web administrator, a simple
firewall, and a conference management system. We compared our tool with Z3 [14], currently
the most advanced general-purpose SMT solver with (limited) support for quantifiers. In
general, our tool performs better than Z3 in several examples for checking the validity of
verification conditions of SmpSL programs. However, our tool and Z3 have complementary
advantages: Z3 does well for unsatisfiable instances while our tool performs better on
satisfiable instances. We performed large experiments with custom-made blown up versions
of the web administrator and the firewall examples, which suggest that our tool scales well.
Moreover, we tested the scalability of our approach by comparing of our underlying FO2
solver with three solvers on a set of benchmarks we assembled inspired by combinatorial
problems. The solvers we tested against are Z3, the SMT solver CVC4 [3], and the model
checker Nitpick [7]. Our solver outperformed each of these solvers on some of the benchmarks.
2 Running Example
We introduce our approach on the example of a simple web service. The example is a
translation from PHP with embedded SQL commands into SmpSL of code excerpts from
the Panda web-administrator. The web service provides several services implemented in
dedicated functions for subscribing a user to a newsletter, deleting a newsletter, making a
user an admin of a newsletter, sending emails to all subscribed users of a newsletter, etc. We
illustrate our verification methodology by exposing an error in the Panda web-administrator.
The verification methodology we envision in this paper consists of (1) maintaining database
invariants and (2) verifying a contract specification for each function of the web service.
The database contains several tables including NS = NewsletterSubscription with at-
tributes nwl, user , subscribed and code. The database is a structure whose universe is
partitioned into three sets: domU, boolB, and codesB. The attributes nwl and user range
over the finite set domU, the attribute subscribed ranges over boolB = {true, false}, and the
attribute code ranges over the fixed finite set codesB. The superscripts in domU, boolB,
and codesB serve to indicate that the domain domU is unbounded, while the Boolean
domain and the domain of codes are bounded (i.e. of fixed finite size). When s = true,
(n, u, s, c) ∈ NS signifies that the user u is subscribed to the newsletter n. The process of
being (un)subscribed from/to a newsletter requires an intermediary confirmation step in
which the confirm code c plays a role.
Figure 1 provides the functions subscribe, unsubscribe, and confirm translated manu-
ally into SmpSL. The comments in quotations // “. . .” originate from the PHP source code.
The intended use of these functions is as follows: To subscribe a user u to a newsletter n,
the function subscribe is called with inputs n and u (e.g. by a web interface operated by
an admin or by the user). subscribe stores the tuple (n, u, false, new_code) in NS , where
new_code is a confirmation code which does not occur in the database, and an email contain-
ing a confirmation URL is sent to the user u. Visiting the URL triggers a call to confirm with
input new_code, which subscribes u to n by replacing the tuple (n, u, false, new_code) of NS
to with (n, u, true, nil). For unsubscribe the process is similar, and crucially, unsubscribe
uses the same confirm function. confirm decides between subscribe and unsubscribe ac-
cording to whether n is currently subscribed to u. The CHOOSE command selects one row
non-deterministically. The database preserves the invariant
Inv = ∀dx, y.∀bs1, s2.∀cc1, c2.
(
(s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2) ∨
∨
i=1,2 ¬NS(x, y, si, ci)
)
(1)
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subscribe(n,u):
A = SELECT * FROM NS WHERE user = u AND nwl = n;
if (A != empty) exit; // "This address is already registered to this
newsletter."
INSERT (n,u,false,new_code) INTO NS;
// Send confirmation email to u
unsubscribe(n,u):
A = SELECT * FROM NS WHERE user = u AND nwl = n;
if (A = empty) exit; // "This address is not registered to this
newsletter."
UPDATE NS SET code = new_code WHERE user = u AND nwl = n
// Send confirmation email to u
confirm(cd):
A = SELECT subscribe FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
if (A = empty) exit; //"No such code"
s1 = CHOOSE A;
if (s1 = false)
UPDATE NS SET subscribed = true, code = nil WHERE code = cd
else DELETE FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
Figure 1 Running Example: SmpSL code.
Inv says that the pair (n, u) of newsletter and user is a key of the relation NS . The subscripts
of the quantifiers denote the domains over which the quantified variables range. In our
verification methodology we add invariants as additional conjuncts to the pre- and post-
conditions of every function. In this way invariants strengthen the pre-conditions and can be
used to prove the post-conditions of the functions. On the other hand, the post-conditions
require to re-establish the validity of the invariants.
Figure 2 provides pre- and post-conditions pref and postf for each of the three functions
f. The relation names d, b, and c are interpreted as the sets domU, boolB, and codesB,
respectively. Proving correctness amounts to proving the correctness of each of the Hoare
triples {pref ∧ Inv} f {postf ∧ Inv}. Each Hoare triple specifies a contract: after every
execution of f, the condition postf ∧ Inv should be satisfied if pref ∧ Inv was satisfied before
executing f. presubscribe and preunsubscribe express that new_code is an unused non-nil code
and that NSgh is equal to NS . NSgh is a ghost table, used in the post-conditions to relate
the state before the execution of the function to the state after the execution. NSgh does
not occur in the functions and is not modified. postsubscribe and postunsubscribe express that
NS is obtained from NSgh by inserting or updating a row satisfying user = u AND nwl = n
whenever the exit command is not executed. The intended behavior of confirm depends
on which function created cd. preconfirm introduces a Boolean ghost variable subgh whose
value is true (respectively false) if cd was generated as a new code in subscribe (respectively
unsubscribe). subgh does not occur in confirm. postconfirm express that, when subgh is
true, NS is obtained from NS by toggling the value of the column subscribed from false to
true in the NSgh row whose confirm code is cd; when subgh is false, NS is obtained from
NSgh by deleting the row with confirm code cd.
S. Itzhaky, T. Kotek, N. Rinetzky, M. Sagiv, O. Tamir, H. Veith, and F. Zuleger 16:5
Let us now describe the error which prevents confirm from satisfying its specification.
Consider the following scenario. First, subscribe is called and then unsubscribe, both
with the same input n and u. Two confirm codes are created: cs by subscribe and cu by
unsubscribe. At this point, NS contains a single row for the newsletter n and user u namely
(n, u, false, cu). The user receives two confirmation emails containing the codes cs and cu.
Clicking on the confirmation URL for cs (i.e. running confirm(cs)) has no effect since cs
does not occur in the database. However, clicking on the confirmation URL for cs results in
subscribing u to n. This is an error, since confirming a code created in unsubscribe should
not lead to a subscription.
Our tool automatically checks whether the program satisfies its specification. If not, the
programmer or verification engineer may try to refine the specification to adhere more closely
to the intended behavior (e.g. by adding an invariant). In this case, the program is in fact
incorrect, so no meaningful correct specification can be written for it.
In Section 3.3 we describe a weakest-precondition calculus wp[[·]] which allows us to
automatically derive the weakest precondition for a post-condition with regard to a SmpSL
program. For our example functions f, wp[[·]] allows us to automatically derive wp[[f]]postf.
The basic property of the weakest precondition is that postf holds after f has executed iff
wp[[f]]postf held immediately at the start of the execution. It then remains to show that
the pre-condition pref implies wp[[f]]postf. This amounts to checking the validity of the
verification conditions VC f = pref → wp[[f]]postf.
Our reasoner for FO2 sentences is the back-end for our verification tool. The specification
in this example is all in FO2BD. The weakest precondition of a SmpSL program applied to a
FO2BD sentence gives again a FO2BDsentence. Hence VC f are all in FO2BD. Automatically
deciding the validity of FO2BD sentences using our FO2 decision procedure is described in
Section 4. Recall that codesB is of fixed finite size. Here |codesB| = 3 is sufficient to detect
the error. Observe that the same confirm code may be reused once it is replaced with nil
in confirm, so the size of the database is unbounded. The size of codesB must be chosen
manually when applying our automatic tool.
A simple way to correct the error in confirm is by adding subgh as a second argument
of confirm and replacing if (s1 = false) · · · with if (subgh = false) · · · . Since s1 is
no longer used, the CHOOSE command can be deleted. The value of subgh received by
confirm is set correctly by subscribe and unsubscribe. With these changes, the error is
fixed and confirm satisfies its specification. In the scenario from above, the call to confirm
with cs and subgh = true leaves the database unchanged, while the call to confirm with cu
and subgh = false deletes the row (n, u, false, cu).
3 Verification of SmpSL Programs
Here we introduce our programming language and our verification methodology. We introduce
the SQL fragment SmpSQL in Section 3.1 and the scripting language SmpSL in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3 we explain the weakest precondition transformer of SmpSL, and we show how
discharging verification conditions of FO2BD specification reduces to reasoning in FO2.
3.1 The SQL fragment SmpSQL
3.1.1 Data model of SmpSQL
The data model of SmpSQL is based on the presentation of the relational model in Chapter 3.1
of [1]. We assume finite sets of domB1 , . . . ,domBs called the bounded domains and an infinite
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preg = NS = NSgh ∧ good-code(new_code)
good-code(c′) = c(c′) ∧ (c′ 6= nil) ∧ ∀dx, y.∀bs.¬NS(x, y, s, c′)
postg = ∀dx, y.∀bs.∀cc.NS(x, y, s, c)↔ (ϕg,1 ∨ ϕg,2)
ϕsubscribe,1 = NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ϕsubscribe,2 = (n = x) ∧ (u = y) ∧ (s = false) ∧ (c = new_code)
∧¬∃bs′.∃cc′.NSgh(n, u, s′, c′)
ϕunsubscribe,1 = ¬ ((n = x) ∧ (u = y)) ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ϕunsubscribe,2 = (n = x) ∧ (u = y) ∧ (c = new_code) ∧ ∃cc′.NSgh(n, u, s, c′)
preconfirm = NS = NSgh ∧ b(subgh)
postconfirm =
∧
tt∈b subgh = tt → (∀dx, y.∀bs.∀cc.NS(x, y, s, c)↔ ψtt)
ψfalse = cd 6= c ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ψtrue = cd 6= c ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c) ∨ (c = nil ∧ s = true ∧NSgh(x, y, false, cd))
Figure 2 Running Example: Pre- and post-conditions. g is either subscribe or unsubscribe.
set domU called the unbounded domain. The domains are disjoint. We assume three disjoint
countably infinite sets: the set of attributes att, the set of relation names relnames, and the
set of variables SQLvars. We assume a function sort : att→ {domU,domB1 , . . . ,domBs }.
A table or a relation schema is a relation name and a finite sequence of attributes. The
attributes are the names of the columns of the table. The arity ar(R) of a relation schema
R is the number of its attributes. A database schema is a non-empty finite set of tables.
A database instance I of a database schema R is a many-sorted structure with finite
domains dom0 ⊆ domU and domj = domBj for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. We denote by sortI the
function obtained from sort by setting sortI(att) = dom0 whenever sort(att) = domU.
The relation schema R = (relname, att1, . . . , atte) is interpreted in I as a relation RI ⊆
sortI(att1)× · · · × sortI(atte). A row is a tuple in a relation RI .
A database schema R is valid for SmpSQL if for all relation schemas R with attributes
att1, . . . , atte in R, there are at most two attributes attj for which sort(attj) = domU. In
the sequel we assume that all database schemas are valid. The SmpSQL commands will be
allowed to use variables from SQLvars. We denote members of SQLvars by p, p1, etc.
3.1.2 Queries in SmpSQL
Given a relation schema R and attributes att1, . . . , attn of R, the syntax of SELECT is:
〈Select〉 ::= SELECT atta1 , . . . , attai FROM R WHERE 〈Condition〉
〈Condition〉 ::= attb1 , . . . , attbj IN 〈Select〉 |
〈Condition〉 AND 〈Condition〉 |
〈Condition〉 OR 〈Condition〉 |
NOT 〈Condition〉 |
attm = p
where p is a variable and 1 ≤ m, a1, . . . , ai, b1, . . . , bj ≤ n. The semantics of 〈Select〉 is the
set of tuples from the projection of R on atta1 , . . . , attai which satisfy 〈Condition〉. The
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condition attm = p indicates that the set of rows of R in which the attribute attm has value p
is selected. The condition attb1 , . . . , attbi IN 〈Select〉 selects the set of rows of R in which
attb1 , . . . , attbi are mapped to one of the tuples queried in the nested query 〈Select〉.
3.1.3 Data-manipulating commands in SmpSQL
SmpSQL supports the three primitive commands INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE.
Let R be a relation schema with attributes att1, . . . , attn. Let p, p1, . . . , pn be variables
from SQLvars. The syntax of the primitive commands is:
〈Insert〉 ::= INSERT (p1, . . . , pn) INTO R
〈Update〉 ::= UPDATE R SET attm = p WHERE 〈Condition〉
〈Delete〉 ::= DELETE FROM R WHERE 〈Condition〉
The semantics of INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE is given in the natural way. We
allow update commands which set several attributes simultaneously. We assume that the
data manipulating commands are used in a domain-correctness fashion, i.e. INSERT and
UPDATE may only assign values from sort(attk) to any attribute attk.
3.2 The script language SmpSL
3.2.1 Data model of SmpSL
The data model of SmpSL extends that of SmpSQL with constant names and additional
relation schemas. We assume a countably infinite set of constant names connames, which
is disjoint from att,domU,domB1 , . . . ,domBs , relnames but contains SQLvars.
A state schema is a database schema R expanded with a tuple of constant names const.
A state interprets a state schema. It consists of a database instance I expanded with a tuple
of universe elements constI interpreting const. In programs, the constant names play the
role of local variables, domain constants (e.g. true and true) and of inputs to the program1.
3.2.2 SmpSL programs
The syntax of SmpSL is given by
〈Program〉 ::= 〈Command〉 | 〈Program〉 ; 〈Command〉
〈Command〉 ::= 〈Insert〉 | 〈Update〉 | 〈Delete〉 | R = 〈Select〉 | d¯ = CHOOSE R |
if (cond) 〈Program〉 | if (cond) exit |
if (cond) 〈Program〉 else 〈Program〉
Every data-manipulating command C of SmpSQL is a SmpSL command. The semantics
of C in SmpSL is the same as in SmpSQL, with the caveat that the variables receive their
values from their interpretations (as constant names) in the state, and C is only legal if all
the variables of C indeed appear in the state schema as constant names.
The command R = 〈Select〉 assigns the result of a SmpSQL query to a relation schema
R ∈ R whose arity and attribute sorts match the select query. Executing the command in a
state (I, constI) sets RI to the relation selected by S, leaving the interpretation of all other
1 We deviate from [1] in the treatment of constants in that we do not assume that constant names are
always interpreted as distinct members of domU. This is so since several program variables or inputs
can have the same value.
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names unchanged. The variables in the query receive their values from their interpretations
in the state, and for the command to be legal, all variables in the query must appear in the
state schema as constant names.
Given a relation schema R ∈ R with attributes att1, . . . , attn and a tuple d¯ = (d1, . . . , dn)
of constant names from const, d¯ = CHOOSE R is a SmpSL command. If RI is empty, the
command has no effect. If RI is not empty, executing this command sets (dI1 , . . . , dIn) to the
value of a non-deterministically selected row from RI .
The branching commands have the natural semantics. Two types of branching conditions
cond are allowed: (R = empty) and (R != empty), which check whether RI is the empty set,
and (c1 = c2) and (c1! = c2), which check whether cI1 = cI2 .
3.3 Verification of SmpSL programs
3.3.1 SQL and FO
It is well-established that a core part of SQL is captured by FO by Codd’s classical theorem
relating the expressive power of relational algebra to relational calculus. While SQL goes
beyond FO in several aspects, such as aggregation, grouping, and arithmetic operations
(see [27]), these aspects are not allowed in SmpSQL. Hence, FO is especially suited for
reasoning about SmpSQL and SmpSL.
The notions of state schema and state fit naturally in the syntax and semantics of FO.
In the sequel, a vocabulary is a tuple of relation names and constant names. Every state
schema R is a vocabulary. A state (I, constI) interpreting a state schema R and a tuple of
constant names const is an
〈
R, const
〉
-structure.
3.3.2 Hoare verification of SmpSL programs and weakest precondition
Hoare logic is a standard program verification methodology [23]. Let P be a SmpSL program
and let ϕpre and ϕpost be FO-sentences. A Hoare triple is of the form {ϕpre}P{ϕpost}. A
Hoare triple is a contract relating the state before the program is run with the state afterward.
The goal of the verification process is to prove that the contract is correct.
Our method of proving that a Hoare triple is valid reduces the problem to that of finite
satisfiability of a FO-sentence. We compute the weakest precondition wp[[P ]]ϕpost of ϕpost
with respect to the program P . The weakest precondition transformer was introduced in
Dijkstra’s classic paper [17], c.f. [24]. Let AP denote the state after executing P on the initial
state A. The main property of the weakest precondition is: AP |= ϕpost iff A |= wp[[P ]]ϕpost .
Using wp[[·]] we can rephrase the problem of whether the Hoare triple {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is
valid in terms of FO reasoning on finite structures: Is the FO-sentence ϕpre → wp[[P ]]ϕpost a
tautology? Equivalently, is the FO-sentence ϕpre ∧¬wp[[P ]]ϕpost unsatisfiable? Section 3.3.3
discusses the resulting FO reasoning task.
We describe the computation of the weakest precondition inductively for SmpSQL and
SmpSL. The weakest precondition for SmpSQL is given in Fig. 3, and for SmpSL in Fig. 4.
For SmpSQL conditions, [[·]]R is a formula with n free first-order variables v1, . . . , vn for a con-
ditional expression in the context of relation schema R of arity n. [[SELECT · · · FROM R · · · ]]
is also a formula with free variables v1, . . . , vn describing the rows selected by the SELECT
query. The rules wp[[s]]Q transform a (closed) formula Q, which is a postcondition of the
command s, into a (closed) formula expressing the weakest precondition. The notation ψ[t/v]
indicates substitution of all free occurrences of the variable v in ψ by the term t.
The notation ψ
[
θ(α1, . . . , αn)/R(α1, . . . , αn)] indicates that any atomic sub-formula of ψ
of the form R(α1, . . . , αn) (for any α1, . . . , αn) is replaced by θ(α1, . . . , αn) (with the same
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[[atti = c]]R =̂ vi = c
[[attb1 , . . . , attbj IN S1]]R =̂ [[S1]][vbk/vk : 1 ≤ k ≤ j]
[[cond1 AND cond2]]R =̂ [[cond1]]R ∧ [[cond2]]R
[[cond1 OR cond2]]R =̂ [[cond1]]R ∨ [[cond2]]R
[[NOT cond1]]R =̂ ¬[[cond1]]R
[[SELECT atta1 , . . . , attai FROM R WHERE cond]] =̂
(∃vai+1 , . . . , vanR(v¯) ∧ [[cond]]R)[v`/va` : 1 ≤ ` ≤ i]
where {a1, . . . , an} = {1, . . . , n}
wp[[INSERT (c1, . . . , cn) INTO R]]Q =̂ Q
[
R(α¯) ∨∧ni=1 αi = ci / R(α¯)]
wp[[DELETE FROM R WHERE cond]]Q =̂ Q
[
R(α¯) ∧ ¬[[cond]]R[αi/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n]
/
R(α¯)
]
wp[[UPDATE R SET attj = c WHERE cond]]Q =̂
Q
[
R(α¯) ∧ ¬[[cond]]R[αi/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n] ∨
∃vjR(αj) ∧ [[cond]]R[αji/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n] ∧ αj = c
/
R(α¯)
]
Figure 3 Rules for weakest precondition for SmpSQL basic commands. We denote by R a relation
schema with attributes 〈att1, . . . , attn〉. We write αji for αi if i 6= j, and for vi if i = j. We denote
v¯ = (v1, . . . , vn), α¯ = (α1, . . . , αn), and αj = (αj1, . . . , αjn). Note that each of the last three rows
Q
[
expr(α)
/
R(α¯)
]
substitutes every occurrence of R with an updated expression expr .
α1, . . . , αn). The formula θ(v1, . . . , vn) has n free variables, and θ(α1, . . . , αn) is obtained by
substituting each vi into αi. The αi may be variables or constant names.
The weakest precondition of a SmpSL program is obtained by applying the weakest
precondition of its commands.
3.3.3 The specification logic FO2BD and decidability of verification
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, using the weakest precondition, the problem of verifying Hoare
triples can be reduced to the problem of checking satisfiability of a FO-sentence by a finite
structure. While this problem is not decidable in general by Trakhtenbrot’s theorem, it is
decidable for a fragment of FO we denote FO2BD, which extends the classical two-variable
fragment FO2. The logic FO2 is the set of all FO formulas which use only variables the
variables x and y. The vocabularies of FO2-sentences are not allowed function names, only
relation and constant names. Note FO2 cannot express that a relation name is interpreted as a
function. FO2 contains the equality symbol =. FO2BD extends FO2 by allowing quantification
on an unbounded number of variables, under the restriction that all variables besides from x
and y range over the bounded domains only.
FO2BD is the language of our invariants and pre- and postconditions, see Eq. (1) and
Fig. 2 in Section 2. An important property of FO2BD is that it is essentially closed under
taking weakest precondition according to Figs. 3 and 4 since all relation schemas in a (valid)
database schema have at most 2 attributes whose sort is domU. We reduce the task of
reasoning over FO2BD to reasoning over FO2.
I Theorem 1. Let {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} be a Hoare triple such that both ϕpre and ϕpost belong to
FO2BD. The problem of deciding whether {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is valid is decidable.
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[[c1 = c2]] =̂ c1 = c2
[[c1 != c2]] =̂ c1 6= c2
[[R ! = empty]] =̂ ∃v1, . . . , vnR(v1, . . . , vn)
[[R= empty]] =̂ ¬∃v1, . . . , vnR(v1, . . . , vn)
wp[[R = SELECT · · · ]]Q =̂ Q
[
[[SELECT · · · ]](α1, . . . , αn)
/
R(α1, . . . , αn)
]
wp[[(d1, . . . , dn) = CHOOSE R]]Q =̂ ∀u1, . . . , un
(
R(u1, . . . , un)→ Q[ui/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n]
)
wp[[if cond s1 else s2]]Q =̂ (¬[[cond]] ∧ wp[[s2]]Q) ∨ ([[cond]] ∧ wp[[s1]]Q)
Figure 4 Rules for weakest precondition construction for SmpSL basic commands. The weakest
precondition of if cond exit; s2 is the same as that of if !cond s2.
Proof (sketch). By Section 3.3.2, {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is valid iff θ = ¬(ϕpre ∧ ¬wp[[P ]]ϕpost) is
satisfiable by a finite structure. We assume for simplicity that in all the tables, the sort of
the first and second attributes att1 and att2 is domU. By Figs. 3 and 4, the only variables
ranging over the unbounded domain are v1 and v2. Let θ′ be the FO2BD sentence obtained
from θ by substituting v1 and v2 with x and y respectively, and restricting the range of the
quantifiers appropriately: for a command manipulating or querying a table R with attributes
att1, . . . , attn in Figs. 3 and 4, each quantifier ∀vk or ∃vk is replaced with ∀sort(attk)vk or
∃sort(attk)vk. We compute an FO2 sentence θ′′ which is equivalent to θ′ by hardcoding the
bounded domains. Every table T with an attribute att with sort(att) = domBj of size d
is replaced with d tables T1, . . . , Td without the attribute att. This change is reflected in
θ′′, e.g. existential quantification is replaced with disjunction. By the decidability of finite
satisfiability of FO2-sentences, we get that The problem of deciding whether {ϕpre}P{ϕpost}
is valid is reduced to the decidability of validity for FO2-sentences. J
4 FO2 Reasoning
4.1 The bounded model property of FO2
Section 4 is devoted to our algorithm for FO2 finite satisfiability. The main ingredient for
this algorithm is the bounded model property, which guarantees that if an FO2(τ) sentence
φ over vocabulary τ is satisfiable by any τ -structure – finite or infinite – it is satisfiable by
a finite τ -structure whose cardinality is bounded by a computable function of φ. Grädel,
Kolaitis and Vardi [21] computed an asymptotically-tight exponential bound bnd(φ), and
based on it gave a NEXPTIME algorithm. The algorithm non-deterministically guesses
t ≤ bnd(φ) and a τ -structure A with universe of size t, then checks whether A satisfies φ,
and answers accordingly.
4.2 Finite satisfiability using a SAT solver
Our algorithm for FO2 finite satisfiability reduces the problem of finding a satisfying model
of cardinality bounded by bnd to the satisfiability of a propositional Boolean formula in
Conjunctive Normal Form CNF, which is then solved using a SAT solver. The bound in
[21] is given for formulas in Scott Normal Form (SNF) only. We use a refinement of SNF
we call Skolemized Scott Normal Form (SSNF). The CNF formula we generate encodes the
semantics of the sentence ψ on a structure whose universe cardinality is bounded by bnd.
An early precursor for the use of a SAT solver for finite satisfiability is [28].
S. Itzhaky, T. Kotek, N. Rinetzky, M. Sagiv, O. Tamir, H. Veith, and F. Zuleger 16:11
4.2.1 Skolemized Scott Normal Form
An FO2-sentence is in Skolemized Scott Normal Form if it is of the form
∀x∀y
(
α(x, y) ∧
m∧
i=1
Fi(x, y)→ βi(x, y)
)
∧
m∧
i=1
∀x∃y Fi(x, y) (2)
where α and βi, i = 1, . . . ,m, are quantifier-free formulas which do not contain any Fj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m. Note that Fi are relation names.
I Proposition 2. Let τ be a vocabulary and φ be a FO2(τ)-sentence. There are polynomial-
time computable vocabulary σ ⊇ τ and FO2(σ)-sentence ψ such that
(a) ψ is in SSNF;
(b) The set of cardinalities of the models of φ is equal to the corresponding set for ψ; and
(c) The size of ψ is linear in the size of φ.
Proposition 2 follows from the discussion before Proposition 3.1 in [21], by applying an
additional normalization step converting SNF sentences to SSNF sentences.23
4.2.2 The CNF formula
Given the sentence ψ in SSNF from Eq. (2) and a bound bnd(ψ), we build a CNF propositional
Boolean formula Cψ which is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable. The formula Cψ will serve as the
input to the SAT solver. First we construct a related CNF formula Bψ. The crucial property
of Bψ is that it is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a model of cardinality exactly bnd(ψ).
It is convenient to assume ψ does not contain constants. If ψ did contain constants c,
they could be replaced by unary relations Uc of size 1.
We start by introducing the variables and clauses which guarantee that Bψ encodes a
structure with the universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}. Later, we will add clauses to guarantee that
this structure satisfies ψ. For every unary relation name U in ψ and `1 ∈ {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)},
let vU,`1 be a propositional variable. For every binary relation name R in ψ and `1, `2 ∈
{1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, let vR,`1,`2 be a propositional variable. The variables vU,`1 and vR,`1,`2
encode the interpretations of the unary and binary relation names U and R in the straight-
forward way (defined precisely below). Let Vψ be the set of all variables vU,`1 and vR,`1,`2 .
Given an assignment S to the variables of Vψ we define the unique structure AS as follows:
1. The universe AS of AS is {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)};
2. An unary relation name U is interpreted as the set {`1 ∈ AS | S(vU,`1) = True};
3. A binary relation name R is interpreted as the set {(`1, `2) ∈ A2S | S(vR,`1,`2) = True};
For every structure A with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, there is S such that A = AS.
Before defining Bψ precisely we can already state the crucial property of Bψ:
I Proposition 3. ψ is satisfiable by a structure with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)} iff Bψ is
satisfiable.
The formula Bψ is the conjunction of Beq, B∀∃, and B∀∀, described in the following.
2 The word Skolemized is used in reference to the standard Skolemization process of eliminating existential
quantifiers by introducing fresh function names called Skolem functions. In our case, since function
names are not allowed in our fragment, we introduce the relation names Fi, to which we refer as Skolem
relations. Moreover, we cannot eliminate the existential quantifiers entirely, but only simplify the
formulas in their scope to the atoms Fi(x, y).
3 The linear size of ψ uses our relation symbols have arity at most 2 to get rid of a log factor in [21].
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The equality symbol. The equality symbol requires special attention. Let
Beq =
∧
1≤`1 6=`2≤m
(¬v=,`1,`2) ∧
∧
1≤`≤m
v=,`,`
Beq enforces that the equality symbol is interpreted correctly as the equality relation on
universe elements.
The ∀∃-conjuncts. For every conjunct ∀x∃y Fi(x, y) and 1 ≤ `1 ≤ bnd(ψ), let B∀∃i,`1 be the
clause
∨bnd(ψ)
`2=1 vFi,`1,`2 . This clause says that there is at least one universe element `2 such
that AS |= F (`1, `2). Let
B∀∃ =
∧
1≤i≤m
∧
1≤`1≤bnd(ψ)
B∀∃i,`1
For every truth-value assignment S to Vψ, AS satisfies
∧m
i=1 ∀x∃y Fi(x, y) iff S satisfies B∀∃.
The ∀∀-conjunct. Let ∀x∀y α′ be the unique ∀∀-conjunct of ψ. For every 1 ≤ `1, `2 ≤
bnd(ψ), let α′′`1,`2 denote the propositional formula obtained from the quantifier-free FO
2
formula α′ by substituting every atom a with the corresponding propositional variable for `1
and `2 as follows:
U(x) 7→ vU,`1 , R(y, y) 7→ vR,`2,`2 , R(x, x) 7→ vR,`1,`1
U(y) 7→ vU,`2 , R(x, y) 7→ vR,`1,`2 , R(y, x) 7→ vR,`2,`1
Let B∀∀`1,`2 be the Tseitin transformation of α
′′
`1,`2
to CNF [36], see also [6, Chapter 2]. The
Tseitin transformation introduces a linear number of new variables of the form uγ`1,`2 , one for
each sub-formula γ of α′′`1,`2 . The transformation guarantees that, for every assignment S of
Vψ, S satisfies α′′`1,`2 iff S can be expanded to satisfy B
∀∀
`1,`2
. Let
B∀∀ =
∧
1≤`1,`2≤bnd(ψ)
B∀∀`1,`2(`1, `2)
Note that [21] guarantees only that bnd(ψ) is an upper bound on the cardinality of a
satisfying model. Therefore, we build a formula Cψ based on Bψ such that Cψ is satisfiable
iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure of cardinality at most bnd(ψ). The algorithm for finite
satisfiability of a FO2-sentence φ consists of computing the SSNF ψ of φ and returning the
result of a satisfiability check using a SAT solver on Cψ. Both the number of variables and
the number of clauses in CUni(ψ) are quadratic in bnd(ψ).
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Details of our tools
The verification condition generator described in Section 3.3.2 is implemented in Java, JFlex
and CUP. It is employed to parse the schema, precondition and postcondition and the SmpSL
programs. The tool checks that the pre and post conditions are specified in FO2 and that the
scheme is well defined. The SMT-LIB v2 [4] standard language is used as the output format
of the verification condition generator. We compare the behavior of our FO2-solver with Z3
on the verification condition generator output. The validity of the verification condition can
be checked by providing its negation to the SAT solver. If the SAT solver exhibits a satisfying
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Table 1 Running time comparison for example benchmarks.
FO2-solver Z3
web-subscribe 0.910s TO
web-unsubscribe 0.741s OM
firewall 0.876s OM
conf-bid 0.451s 0.015s
conf-assign 0.369s 0.013s
conf-display 0.992s 0.016s
incorrect
FO2-solver Z3
web-subscribe 1.04s 0.02s
web-unsubscribe 1.46s 0.02s
firewall 18.50s 0.03s
conf-bid TO 0.22s
conf-assign 1.196s 0.2s
conf-display TO 0.16s
correct
assignment then that serves as counterexample for the correctness of the program. If no
satisfying assignment exists, then the generated verification condition is valid, and therefore
the program satisfies the assertions. The FO2-solver described in Section 4 is implemented
in python and uses pyparsing to parse the SMT-LIB v2 [4] file. The FO2-solver assumes a
FO2-sentence as input and uses Lingeling [5] SAT solver as a base Solver.
5.2 Example applications
We tried our approach with a few programs inspired by real-life applications. The first case
study is a simplified version of the newsletter functionality included in the PANDA web
administrator, that was already discussed and is shown in Fig. 1.4
The second is an excerpt from a firewall that updates a table of which device is allowed
to send packets to which other device. The third is a conference management system with
a database of papers, and transactions to manage the review process: reviewers first bid
on papers from the pool of submissions, with a policy that a users cannot bid for papers
with which they are conflicted. The chair then assigns reviewers to papers by selecting
a subset of the bids. At any time, users can ask to display the list of papers, with some
details, but the system may hide some confidential information, in particular, users should
not be able to see the status of papers before the program is made public. We show how our
system detects an information flow bug in which the user might learn that some papers were
accepted prematurely by examining the session assignments. This bug is based on a bug we
observed in a real system. Each example comes with two specifications, one correct and the
other incorrect.
The running time in seconds for all of our examples is reported in Table 1. Timeout is
set to 60 minutes and denoted as TO. If the solver reaches out of memory we mark it as OM.
On the set of correct examples, Z3 terminates within milliseconds, while FO2-solver takes a
few seconds and times out on some of them. On the set of incorrect examples, Z3 fails to
answer while our solver performs well. Note that correct examples correspond to unsatisfiable
FO2-sentences, while incorrect examples correspond to satisfiable FO2-sentences.
5.3 Examining scalability
Inflated examples. In order to evaluate scalability to large examples we inflated our base
examples. For instance, while the subscribe example from Table 1 consisted of the subscription
4 We omit the confirmation step due to a missing feature in the implementation of the weakest precondition,
however the final version of the tool will support the code from Table 1.
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of one new email to a mailing-list, Table 2 presents analogous examples based on combining
the verification conditions arising from subscribing multiple emails to the mailing-list. The
column multiplier details the number of individual subscriptions based on which the formula
is constructed. The unsubscribe and firewall example programs are inflated similarly.
We have tested both our FO2-solver and Z3 on large examples and the results reported
in Table 2. The high-level of the results is similar to the case of the small examples. On the
incorrect examples set Z3 continues to fail mostly due to running out of memory, though it
succeeds on the subscribe example. On the correct examples set Z3 continues to outperform
the FO2-solver.
Artificial examples. In addition, we constructed a set of artificial benchmarks comprising
of several families of FO2-sentences. Each family is parameterized by a number that controls
the size of the sentences (roughly corresponding to the number of quantifiers in the sentence).
These problems are inspired by combinatorial problems such as graph coloring and paths.
We ran experiments using the FO2-solver and three publicly available solvers: Z3, CVC4
(which are SMT solvers), and Nitpick (a model checker). The results are collected in Table 3.
Scalability of FO2-solver. We shall conclude that the FO2-solver, despite being a proof-of-
concept prototype implemented in Python with minimal optimizations, handles satisfiable
sentences well and also scales well for them. It struggles on unsatisfiable sentences and
does not scale well. SMT solvers usually find unsatisfiability proofs much faster, esp. when
quantifiers are involved, because they do not have to instantiate all clauses and can terminate
as soon as a core set of contradicting clauses is found. This suggests that in practice we
may choose to run both FO2-solver and Z3 in parallel and answer according the first result
obtained. We also intend to explore how to improve the performance of our solver in the
case of incorrect examples. By construction, whenever FO2-solver finds a satisfying model,
its size is at most 4 times that of the minimal model. (The constant 4 can be decreased or
increased.)
Tools and benchmarks online.
1. FO2Solver :
http://forsyte.at/people/kotek/fo2-solver/
2. SmpSL Verification Conditions Generator :
http://forsyte.at/people/kotek/smpsl-verification-conditions-generator/
3. Benchmarks for FO2:
http://forsyte.at/people/kotek/two-variable-fragment-benchmarks/
6 Discussion
Related work. Verification of database-centric software systems has received increasing
attention in the last decade, see for example the recent survey [15]. Below, we explain how
our approach differs from the works surveyed in [15]. [15] assumes the services accessing
the database to be provided a priori in terms of a local contract given by a pre- and post-
condition (see also [31, 26]). The focus of verification then is on the verification of global
temporal properties of the system, assuming the local contracts. While the services may be
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Table 2 Running time comparison on inflated examples.
FO2-solver Z3
multiplier 1 10 100 1 10 100
incorrect subscribe 0.910s 3.84s 785.2s TO TO TO
unsubscribe 0.741s 1.70s 209.2s TO TO TO
firewall 0.876s 3.75s 455.7s OM OM OM
correct subscribe 1.04s TO TO 0.02s 0.03s 0.10s
unsubscribe 1.46s TO TO 0.02s 0.03s 0.09s
firewall 18.50s TO TO 0.03s 0.03s 0.11s
Table 3 Running time comparison on artificial benchmarks.
size status Z3 CVC4 Nitpick FO2-solver
2col 3 unsat 0m0.037s 0m0.076s TO TO
4 sat TO TO 0m7.038s 0m5.433s
5 unsat 0m0.702s 0m0.477s TO TO
6 sat TO TO 0m8.973s 0m9.323s
10 sat TO TO 0m37.944s 0m19.580s
11 unsat 1m32.664s 0m30.912s TO TO
14 sat TO TO 2m13.661s TO
40 sat TO TO TO TO
alternating-paths 2 sat 0m0.049s TO 0m11.144s 0m1.105s
100 sat TO TO TO 0m9.671s
alternating-simple-paths 3 sat TO TO TO 0m6.754s
4 sat TO TO TO 0m10.128s
7 sat TO TO TO TO
10 sat TO TO TO TO
exponential 3 sat TO TO 0m12.255s 0m1.847s
4 sat TO TO 0m15.358s 11m6.482s
one-var-alternating-sat 300 sat 0m0.037s 0m0.497s 0m11.605s 0m9.720s
one-var-alternating-unsat 5 unsat 0m0.026s 0m0.073s 0m22.537s 0m54.198s
one-var-nested-exists-sat 300 sat 0m0.031s 0m0.045s 0m7.132s 0m0.562s
one-var-nested-forall-sat 500 sat 0m0.033s TO 0m7.183s 0m7.318s
path-unsat 2 unsat 0m0.033s 0m0.044s TO 1m37.099s
3 unsat 0m0.030s 0m0.062s TO 1m35.451s
6 unsat 0m0.037s 0m0.891s TO 1m39.209s
automatically synthesized in some cases, e.g. [19, 20, 15, 16], they are often implemented
manually (e.g. using a scripting language) and the validity of their contracts needs to be
verified. This is the verification problem we target in this paper: we show how to prove the
correctness of a single service with regard to its pre- and postcondition. The approaches have
orthogonal strengths: The works surveyed in [15] use (modulo reductions) the existential
fragment of first-order logic (∃FO) to formalize local changes to the database and allow the
verification of LTL properties whose atoms are given by ∃FO-formulae. In contrast, our
approach is limited to the verification of local pre- and post-conditions and system invariants.
On the other hand we allow universal quantification in our specifications. It is an interesting
direction for future work how to extend our approach to more general temporal properties
(e.g. as considered in [15]).
Several papers use variations of FO2 to study verification of programs that manipulate
relational information. [8] presents a verification methodology based on FO2, a description
logic and a separation logic for analyzing the shapes and content of in-memory data structures.
[33] develops a logic similar to FO2 to reason about shapes. In both [8] and [33], the focus is
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on analysis of dynamically-allocated memory, and databases are not studied. Furthermore,
no tools based on these works are available. Our work draws inspiration from [2], which
discusses the verification of evolving graph databases based on a description logic related
to FO2 and a dedicated action language. Our work and [2] exhibit some similarity on a
technical level but have a different focus: [2] advocates the use of description logic, while we
consider the use of a scripting language with embedded SQL to be advantageous because
it does not require to learn new syntax (the identification of an appropriate language and
SQL fragment is one of the contributions of this paper); establishing the precise technical
relationship between our framework and [2] seems possible but requires additional work to be
carried out. Further, the verification method suggested by [2] was not implemented. To our
knowledge no description logic solver implements reasoning tasks for the description logic
counterpart of FO2 studied in [2], not even solvers for expressive description logics such as
SROIQ. The authors of [2] extended their work to description logics with path constrains
in [9].
Verification of script programs with embedded queries has revolved around security,
see [18]. However, it seems no other work has been done on such programs.
Conclusion and future work. We developed a verification methodology for script programs
with access to a relational database via SQL. We isolated a simple but useful fragment
SmpSQL of SQL and developed a simple script programming language SmpSL on top
of it. We have shown that verifying the correctness of SmpSL programs with respect to
specifications in FO2BD is decidable. We implemented a solver for the FO2 finite satisfiability
problem, and, based on it, a verification tool for SmpSL programs. Our experimental results
are very promising and suggest that our approach has great potential to evolve into a
mainstream method for the verification of script programs with embedded SQL statements.
While we believe that many of the SQL statements that appear in real-life programs fall
into our fragment SmpSQL it is evident that future tools need to consider all of database
usage in real-world programs. In future work, we will explore the extension of SmpSL
and SmpSQL. Our next goal is to be able to verify large, real-life script programs such as
Moodle [29], whose programming language and SQL statements use e.g. some arithmetic
or simple inner joins. To do so, we will adapt our approach from the custom-made syntax
of SmpSL to a fragment of PHP. We will both explore decidable logics extending FO2BD,
and investigate verification techniques based on undecidable logics including the use of first-
order theorem provers such as Vampire [34, 25] and abstraction techniques which guarantee
soundness but may result in spurious errors [12]. For dealing with queries with transitive
closure, it is natural to consider fragments of Datalog [10].
A natural extension is to consider global temporal specifications in addition to local
contracts. Here the goal is to verify properties of the system which can be expressed in a
temporal logic such as Linear Temporal Logic LTL [32, 11]. The approach surveyed in [15],
which explore global temporal specifications of services given in terms of local contracts, may
be a good basis for studying global temporal specifications in our context.
Another research direction which emerges from the experiments in Section 5 is to explore
how to improve the performance of our FO2 solver on unsatisfiable inputs.
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